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Development economists lhave  long argued that  lines. As for financial structure, financial con-
modem financial markets are important to  tracts and institutions ought ideally to be de-
growth and that financial repression is a serious  signed to minimize this premium.
obstacle to progress in many developing coun-
tries. But the liberalization of financial markets  What are the practical implications for
has been disappointing in many countries  -at  policymakers? The long-term answers are
times appearing to produce chaos rather than  easiest. A largely decentralized capital market is
growth, and forcing many countries to retreat  optimal. Incentive problems may inhibit the
from deregulation. Now that economic stagna-  functioning of financial markets, but the most
tion seems to persist in many developing coun-  direct way for the government to mitigate them
tries, many policymake;s face a dilemma:  is to provide an efficient system for enforcing
Should they cling to repressed financial markets  contracts. Publicly r. -naging credit flows is
or try the road to reform once again?  likely only to make investments more efficient,
by creating incentive problems. To the extent
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between finance and growth and the appropriate  credits or subsidies in conjunction with the
role of government policy. Many economists  private allocation of credit is preferable to
have stressed how problems of asymmetric  directly regulating credit flows. The government
information and contract enforcement impede  should refrain from active involvement in the
the functioning of firnancial  markets in develop-  credit business, except to act as Iender of last
ing countries. Gertler and Rose flesh these  resort in times of widespread financial cfisis.
theories out to make them relevant to policymak-
ers.  Liberalization of financial markets alone is
not a panacea. Financial and real development
They explain that infonnation gaps and  must be a joint product. Liberalization can
enforcement frictions introduce a premium in the  enhance growth but successful liberalization
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ing private financial contracts govem the size of  economy is thriving are likely to experience
this premium. How financial factors contribute  more successful financial reforns.
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IntroductionI
Development economists have long argued that the evolution of financial
markets is an important dimension of growth.  A corollary view is that
financial repreosion in many LDCs is a serious obstacle to progress.  But,
unfortunately, many countries have had disappointi.  .g  experiences with
liberalization.  Freeing up financial markets often appeared to produce chaos
rather than growth, forcing many countries to retreat from deregulation.  Now
that economic stagnation seems to persist in many developing countries,
policy-makers face a dilemma:  Should they cling to repressed financial
markets or, instead, should they try the road to reform once again?
In this paper, we reconsider the relation between finance and growth,
and the appropriate role of government policy.  We update earlier treatments
of the subject by applying insights from recent theoretical literature that
draws out the connection between the efficiency of financial markets and
macroeconomic performance.2  We try to informally sketch a paradigm meant to
be useful for thinking about the special problems that plague financial
systems of developing countries.  The overriding objective is  to provide a
basis for thinking about the process of financial reform.  In addition, we
present some macroeconomic evidence bearing on the relation between finance
and growth.
Section I develops a benchmark for analysis by characterizing the role
of financial markets in a setting of perfect markets.  Section II provides a
brief overview of the stylized facts on the relation between finance and
growth.  Section III presents a nontechnical discussion of the relevant
theory.  The theory emphasizes not only how the efficiency of financial
markets may contribute to growth, but also how the real sector feeds back to
influence the performance of  the financial system.
tThis  paper  was  prepared  for  a  World  Bank  research  project  (The  Impact  of  Financial  Reform,  RPO
676-13). The  authors  wish  to  thank  Izak  Atiyas,  Jerry  Caprio,  Steven  Kamin,  and SaLvador  Valdes-
Prieto  for  their  comnents
2See  Gertler  (1988)  for  a  survey.5
Section IV extends the analysis to the special problems of developing
countries, incluling financial repression and obstacles to financial reform.
We draw several related kinds of policy conclusions.  First, even though
frictions exist which impede the performance of private financial markets, a
decentralized capital market is vastly superior to a system of publicly
managing credit flows.  To flourish, a private capital market requires an
efficient system of contract enforcement and a viable borrowing class.  Public
policy should be directed specifically toward these objectives, and away from
directly tinkering in credit flows.  Second, liberalization must be
coordinated both with policies that encourage growth and stability of the real
sector.  Financial reform alone is insufficient to generate recovery, and some
aspects of reform may even be counterproductive in the short term due to a
initial adverse impact on borrowers' creditworthiness.  Enhancing the
creditworthiness of borrowers through prudent "real sector" policies is
crucial to the success of any liberalization.  Finally, to avoid potentially
massive efficiency costs, any deregulation of financial markets must be
coordinated with the design of the financial safety net.  While some (or  all)
of these policy conclusions may not be new, we think that our way of deriving
them may offer a fresh perspective.
Section V presents some formal econometric evidence on the relation
between finance and growth, in order to confirm that the evolution of the
financial sector is an important d.%vension  of the growth process, and to give
some feel for the rough magnitudes.  :%e  use a panel of developing countries,
and differ from most existing studies, beginning with Goldsmith  (1969), by
formally exploiting both the time series and cross-sectional dimensions of the
panel.  Our results are consistent with the earlier studies.  We find that,
across developing countries, a one percentage point rise in per capita income
is associated with a one and a half percentage point increase in private
domestic credit.  While differences arise across continents (stronger for
Asia, weaker for Africa), the relation is otherwise very robust.  Concluding
remarks are in Section VI.
To narrow the focus, we ignore specific issues related to sovereign6
borrowing --  in particular, the issues posed by the inability to enforce
contracts across national borders.  Our analysis, however, will have something
to say about the consequences of a large foreign debt overhang for the
economic performance of LDCS.
I.  Financial Systems Under Perfect Markets
A financial system contributes to growth and development by mobilizing
saving and then efficiently allocating this saving across investment projects.
Related to effectively engineering flows of funds is providing insurance to
risk averse savers and investors.  An added task within an open econo  i3
helping domestic lenders and borrowers compete effectively in international
capital markets.
As a way to organize our thinking, we first consider how financial
markets work in an idealized economy, one with the key features of the
Arrow-Debreu paradigm.  We begin with this paradigm because it often serves as
the basis of policy recommendations.  Suppose that perfect competition exists,
that information is freely availaDle, and that individuals can credibly commit
to honoring all agreements.  The financial system performs flawlessly in this
environment.  The absence of informational frictions and the ability of
contracting parties to make credible promises implies that everyone is able to
lend and borrow freely at risk-corrected rates of interest.  Market forces
consequently allocate income efficiently between consumption and saving, and
then in turn allocate saving efficiently across investment projects.  Each
individual adjusts his saving to equalize the marginal utility of a unit of
foregcne consumption with the expected marginal benefit --  the expected
product of the gross return on saving and the discounted marginal utility of
future consumption.  The total funds furnished from saving flow to equalize
risk-corrected marginal returns acro.s investment projects.  Competitive
forces ensure that lending and borrowing rates adjust to clear markets and
that no one earns extranormal profits.  And the entire process is costlessa
the flow of funds from savers to borrowers does not absorb any resources.7
An open economy differs in that there is no exact link between domestic
saving and investment.  In the pure Arrow-Debreu version oi the international
economy, cou try borders are essentially meaningless.  Domestic bor7owers
compete on an equal footing with foreign borrowers in the international
capital market, much the same as corporations located in New York and New
Jersey compete for funds in the U.S. capital market.  The analogous poi.nt  is
true for savers.  These individuals are able to search over the entire world
capital market for the best possible riek-corrected returns.  Notably, the
basic Arrow Debreu framework --  with constant returns to scale --  predicts
that funds will flow from low marginal product of capital rich countries to
high marginal product of capital poor countries, just as the capital market
works to equalize risk-corrected marginal products of capital within a
country'  s border.3
An aspect of allocating of saving and investment is providing insurance.
Through a variety of mechianisms  --  e.g., diversification, futures markets,
debt-equity swaps --  individuals are able to shed completely exposure to
idiosyncratic risks and to share optimally the impact of systemic risks.
Borrowers thus need only pay lenders a premium for the systemic risk
associated with their particular investmente, regardless of the amount of
idiosyncratic risk.  The key point is that, with perfect markets, the
1  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
financial system washes a considerable quantity of risk out of the economy.
In equilibrium, only (optimally shared) systemic risks are left to influence
saving and investment.  And, given that the variation in GNP is a rough
measure, this is not much risk at all.  Diminishing the impact of risk,
therefore, is an important way in which the financial system increases the
attractiveness of saving and investing, and ultimately contributes to growth.
Another dimension of allocating saving and investment is liquidity
3This  presumes  that  technology  is  the  same  across  countries,  so  that  differences  in  capital
explain  cross-country  differences  in  output.
4As  an  example,  the  Arrow-Debreu  model  predicts  a  risk  premium  for  equity  of  only  about  one  half
percent  (Mehra  and  Prescott,  1985). Part  of  the  reason  for  this  low  number  is  that  perfect
diversification  is  possible.  The  actual  equity  premium  in  the  United  States  was  about  six  percent
for  the  1960s-70s.8
provision.  Indeed, liquidity problems never arise in the Arrow-Debreu
economy.  Borrowers and lenders are able to make fully contingent arrangements
to insure against unanticipated short term needs for funds.  Similerly, since
information is perfect aid markets for all financial claims are thick,
"distress" sales of assets always yield the true market value.  For this
reason, and also because a full set of contingent claims markets exists, there
is no need for precautionary holdings of safe assets.
Relatedly, there is no need for a public lender of last resort as
safeguard against a liquidity crisis.  Here, the government cannot out perform
the private sector.  Through private contracts, individuals are able to obtain
the efficient amount of insurance.  In general, any public intervention in
financial markets is only counterproductive since the private market outcome
is fully efficient.
Finally, the perfect markets paradigm is silent about the role of
financial contracts and institutions.  The theory only makes predictions about
real allocations.  Financial structure is both irrelevant and indeterminate,
in keeping with the Miller-Modigliani theorem.  Growth accordingly depends
only on real factors --  mainly, changes in technology and the supply of
productive inputs.  Because it is costless to obtain information and enforce
contracts, individuals can enter financial relacionships without the aid of
institutions.  That is, financial intermediaries are not essential.  The
theory accordingly offers no particular predictions about the evolution of
financial relationships and institutions in the growth process.
1I. Financial and Real Development: An Overview
Even in the most advanced economies, financial markets perform less well
than the Arrow-Debreu model predicts.  Studies of U.S micro data, for example,
consistently suggest that frictions are present in loan markets which raise
the cost of borrowing, particularly for low wealth consumers and small firms.
Panel data studies of individual households, for example, indicate that
consumaption  spending by low wealth consumers is "excessively-sensitive" tocurrent income (Zeldes, 1989).  Similarly, panel data studies of firms show
that investment is sensitive to current cash flow, even after controlling for
expected future profits.  (Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, I988; Gilchrist,
1990).  And the cash flow effect is stronger for firms likely to be
constrained a priori (e.g., small firms).  In addition, both households and
firms hold sizable quantities of liquid assets.  This suggests that the need
for (at least some degree of) self-insurance arises even in industrialized
economies.
Determinant financing patterns are also present in U.S. data, implying a
clear violation of Miller-ModiglLanL.  Small firms rely on internal funds and
bank credit.  Typically, only larga mature funds directly obtain funds from
lenders.  Issues of equity, commercial paper and debt are concent-ated amongst
these firms.  Evidence from other countries is broadly consistent with this
pattern.
At the macroeconomic level, the collapse of financial markets in the
Great Depresslon demonstrates that major dleruptions in the flow of funds are
possible, and that these episodes can severely impede real activity, even
within industrialized countries (Bernanke, 1983).  Recent examples are the
financial crises in several southern cone countries that followed in the wake
of the liberal!zations of the 1970s (Diaz-Alejandro, 1983).  The possibility
of financial crises also raises the difficult question of public policy.  Most
policy makers and economists agree that some kind of safety net is essential.
However, the provision of public insurance introduces some clear efficiency
tradeof's.  The current crisis in the U.S. banking and saving and loan
industrLes provides a clear example.  A similar message follows from the
outcomes of the financial reforms in Latin America, as we will diecuse.
More to broader point here, the international evidence suggest a
determinate relation between the states of development in the real sector and
the financial sectors. 5 The general patterns hold across countries, as well
as across time within a country.  In the poorest of the LDCs, individuals and
5See  The  World  Bank  Development  Report  for  more  detaiLed  statistics  on  this  phenomenon.10
firmo rely hleavily  on internal resources and informal credit arrangements.  As
well, they hoard 4.nventories  of goods to self-insure, in effect siphonina
saving from productive investments.  Commercial banks are the predominant
financial institutions.  Formal markets for direct credit --  particularly for
long term debt and equity --  are virtually non-existent.  These countries also
borrow relatively little from abroad.  A sizable fraction of external funds,
moreover, is obtained from public sources.
Financialization appears to accompany growth in the real sector. 6 As
economies develop, non-bank intermediaries crop up, offering borrowers and
lendare a  greater range of options.  Another outcome is that more capital
tends to flow in from abroad, in contrast to the prediction of the simple
neoclassical model.  Across developing countries, the ratio of external
borrowing to GDP tends to rise with GDP.7 Further, the composition shifts
from public sources to private sources.
As development proceeds further, markets for direct debt and equity
emerge.8  The variety and magnitude of financial institutions and services
continues to grow, improving the allocation of saving and investment.  For
example, insurance companies and pension funds become important sources of
long term credit.  They also improve the allocation of saving by reducing the
need for individuals to self insure. 9 Because less saving is needed for safe
assets like government debt and durable goods inventories, more can flow to
productive investments.
The observed link between financialization and growth is suggestive that
financial factors may be important in development, but of course is not
definitive about the exact nature and importance of the interaction, or about
the rroper role of public policy.  To explore these issues further, it is
6Gurtey  and Shaw  (1956)  outline  the  stages  of  financialization.
7See  Gertler  and  Rogoff  (1990)  for  evidence.
%Equity  market  exist  in some  developing  countries,  but typically  these  markets  are not very
liquid. See  the  Wortd  Sank  Development  Report  (1989).
9sencevenga  and  Smith  (1990)  formaLize  this  point.11
useful to turn to a discussion of theories that may rationalize a meaningful
interaction between the real and financial sectora.
IX!.  Financial Factors in Growth and Developments Theory
A major challenge for any theory of finance and growth ls to explain the
joint evolution of the financial and real sectors.  It is insufficient, for
example, to simply posit that financial markets work less well in poorer
countries, and then proceed to explore the consequences.  Financial systems
are endogenous, after all.  And they change over time.  Required is an
understanding of what determines the relative efficiency of a country's
financial system, and how this efficiency may evolve.
A useful way to organize thinking is to first identify the primitive
factors that might explain why the Miller-ModiglLani theorem doesn't apply in
practice.  The most natural candidates are limited information and limited
ability to enforce contracts. 10 Either factor is, to varying degrees,
characteristic of real-world financial markets, particularly financial markets
in developing countries.  And incorporating either factor in a model is
conceptually the most basic way to step outside the confines of -.. he
Miller-Modigliani.
In this section we first present a general description of how
informational and enforcement problems introduce frictions in the relationship
between individual borrowers and lenders.  As we argue, these factors
effectively force borrowers to pay an additional premium for uncollateralized
loans and for insurance.  We refer to this added cost generically as "the
p-mium  for external finance."  We then illustrate the implications for
financial structure, including the nature of both financial contracts and
institutions.  Next is a disc-4sion of what we view as an important general
;diction  of these kinds of tneories: an inverse relation between borrower
net worth and the premium for external finance.  We conclud' by describing the
l°See  Hart  and  Hotmstrom  (1986)  for  an  excetlent  survey  of  the  economics  of  information,  which
contains  applications  to  finarcfaL  markets.12.
general predictions of our story regarding the link between finance and
growth.  Along the way, we try to draw out the issues pertinent to public
pol'.cy.
XZIa.  The  premium  for external finance
To sharpen the analysis, consider the example of farmer who is in need
of funds to obtain seed for growing corn.  The investment is risky because the
quantity of corn harvested is random.  It is a stochastic function of the
amount of seed planted, the soil quality, and the effort the farn,er  puts into
planting and maintaining his crop.
In the Arrow-Debreu se  :ing,  the farmer borrows funds from lenders and
in the process enters a financial agreement that specifies all the relevant
actions he is to take under every potential circumstance, as well as a set of
state contingent payoffs to each party.  In particular, the parties agree in
writing to the time and effort the farmer must place into harvesting and
planting.  They also agree to the payments each party should receive,
depending on the realized harvest of corn.  The soil quality figures into this
calculation since it affects the probability distribution of the harvest
outcome.  If the crop risk is purely idiosyncratic, the expected payment to
lenders must equal the riskless interest rate.  To the extent there systemic
risk, perhaps due to weather conditions, lenders are compensated with an
additional premium.
A key point is that with perfect information and perfect contract
enforcement the farmer's real investment decision is both socially efficient
and independent of his financial position.  Regardless of his balance sheet,
it is always optimal for the farmer to invest so as to maximize the value of
his farm --  that is, for him to plant seed until the expected gain from the
corn harvest equals the risk-corrected opportunity cost of funds.  Further,
the kind of financial claims the farmer issues is indeterminate.  Though the
total expected payments to lenders must properly reflect the systemic risk,
the exact pattern of payoffs across risky output realizations may take13
numerous forms.  Whether the firm issues equity or risky debt does not matter
so long as lenders receive in expectation the risk-corrected opportunity cost
of funds.  Also immaterial is whether the farmer finances his acquisition of
seed with internal funds, by borrowing from financial institutions or by
obtaining credit directly from individual lenders.
As we have emphasized, the prediction of efficient allocations of saving
and investment --  independent of the nature of financial institutions --
relies on the supposition that individuals may costlessly write and enforce
richly detailed financial contracts.  This "completeness" of financial
markets, however, may not be a reasonable approximation of reality if either
information or the ability to enforce contracts is significantly limited.  In
our example of the farmer, both these restrictions are quite plausible.
It is reasonable to hypothesize that re.-l  world lenders may not be able
to freely observe all the relevant aspects of the farmer's investment project.
They may have less knowledge than the farmer about the soil quality.  They may
have difficulty monitoring how hard he works.  They may find it costly to
verify the size  of the harvest.  In each of these situations, the farmer can
potentially gain by exploiting his advantage in information.
It is also plausible that enforcing particular aspects of the financial
contract is costly, perhaps even prohibitively costly.  Even if lenders cun
freely observe all the relevant economic variables, the same may not be true
for third party institutiont.  such as courts, making it difficult to enforce
contracts based on t.,ese  contingencies.  For example, even if lenders can
freely determine that the farmer has misrepresented the size of his crop, it
may still involve considerable expense to demonstrate this point in court.
Costs of carrying out punishments --  e.g., costs of collecting fines or
imprisoning offenders --  may also be factor, particularly for developing
countries.  In either case, enforcement costs permit circumstances to arise
where the farmer gains on net by walking away from his debts, much as like for14
a sovereign country. 11
Rational lenders recognize the potential for conflicts of interest with
the farmer, and try to structure the financial arrangements accordingly.  The
information and enforcement problems, however, limit the ecope of the
financial contract --  the feasible set of contingencies and covenants --  and,
in doing so, limit the flexibility lenders have in regulating the farmer's
behavior.  Mitigating the possible incentive problems, therefore, may involve
restrictions on the financial contract that introduce some kind of real costs.
In this way, frictions enter the financial process.
Intuitively, a wedge emerges between the cost of (uncollateralized)
external funds and internal funds.  12 That is, the farmer pays a premium for
uncollateralized external funds.  Roughly speaking, this premium compensates
for the costs of resolving the conflict of interests with lenders.  It may
consist of both explicit and implicit components, depending on the nature of
the incentive problem and the informational structure.  If his particular soil
quality is not publicly observable, for example, the farmer may have to pay an
explicit "lemons" premium for external funds.  This is because lenders are
forced to use the average soil quality in the region to calculate the expected
harvest yield.  3  Lenders will also charge an explicit premium to compensate
for any expected costs of evaluation or monitoring. 14
The implicit component of the premium reflects loss in the value of the
borrower's investment that stems from any constraints on the financial
relationship.  One example is the reduction in expected profits the farmer
suffers if lenders restrict the size of the loan, perhaps in fear that he will
11Even In  the U.S.,  limits  on punishments  seem  characteristic  of  financial  arrangements.  For
exanple, under  U.S. bankruptcy  laws, consumers  can walk away  from their  debts and still  retain  their
most vital  assets  --  their  homes  and their  human  capital.  See Kehoe and Levine  (1989)  for  an
abstract  discussion  of  how limits  on  punishments introduce  inefficiencies  in  domestic  capital
markets.
12See  Bernanke  and Gertler  (1989,  1990) for  explicit  calculations  of  this  premiun).
3See  Mankiw (1986) and  Bernanke  and Gertler  (1990)  for  exanples.
14See  the  costly  state  verification  model of  Townsend  (1979),  Gale  and HelIwig  (1985)  and
Williamson (1987)  for  examples.15
misuse the funds or renege on his debts.  Another one is the reduction in
expected utility owing to restrictions on the amount of insurance lenders are
willing to provide.  If lenders are unable to observe how well the business is
managed they may restrict the extent they insure the farmer against bad
harvests.  They may instead require that the farmer bear a good portion of the
risk, as a way to motivate him to properly plant and harvest his crop15.
This limitation on insurance reduces the expected utility gain to the farmer,
and thus reduces the value of his investment.
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate how the premium for external finance distorts
the farmer's real investment decision.  In each diagram, the dotted lines
represent the demand and supply curves for investment funds under perfect
information, and the solid lines represent these curves when incentive
problems are present.  Under perfect information, the farmer faces a perfectly
elastic supply curve of investment funds.  The  discount rate is p, equal to
the sum of the riskless rate and a premium that reflects any systemic risk.
The demand curve is downward sloping because the expected marginal increase in
the harvest yield is diminishing.  Point E, where the two dotted lines
intersect, is the value-maximizing choice of investment.  This outcome,
however, may not be feasible if incentive problems are present.
Limits on either information or enforcement potentially affect the
position of both the demand and the supply curves.  Up to the point where the
quantity of  funds equals the farmer's collaterizeable net worth --  call this
value W --  the supply curve is unchanged.  The opportunity cost of funds
remains the same as under perfect information since the farmer is able to
either self-finance his investment or provide perfect collateral for any funds
borrowed.  Beyond W, uncollateralized external finance is required.  The
supply curve rises, reflecting the premium on external funds that emanates
from the incentive problems.  The supply curve continues to rise as external
finance increases, and may eventually bend backwards.  This might be the case,
for example, if the quality mix of borrowers declines with increases in the
151ncomptete  insurance  is  a  standard  approach  to  mitigating  moral  hazard  problems  (see  Hart  and
Holmstrron,  1986.)16
loan rate.16,17 After a point, further increases in the loan rate may
actually reduce the expected return tt lenders, given the impact on the
quality mix.  The farmer's demand for funds may decline as well, if solving
the incentive problem requires restricting the quantity of insurance he can
obtain against a bad crop yield.  Presuming he is risk averse, this
restriction reduces the farmer's expected marginal utility gain at each level
of investment thereby pushing downward his demand curve for investment funds.
The combined impact on the demand and supply curves forces the farmer's
desired investment level below the socially efficient value, as Figure 1
illustrates.  Indeed, if the supply curve bends backward before it intersects
the demand curve for funds, the farmer is "rationed" in the sense that his
demand for investment funds exceeds the supply at the prevailing rate of
interest.  Figure 2 illustrates this possibility.  Regardless of whether there
is rationing, though, the costs imposed by incentive problems ultimately
distort the farmer's investment decision.  Investment in either case is below
the level that would prevail under perfect information.
The premium attached to external funds equals the wedge between the
perfect information demand and supply curves arising at the equilibrium level
of  investment.  This value reflects the real cost that the incentive problem
adds to the marginal dollar of external finance.  Dividing the premium by the
firm's discount rate under perfect information yields the excess of  the firm's
"Q"  value of investment over unity.18 As Figure 1 makes clear, the farmer's
marginal Q value exceeds unity; and it is larger, the more severe the impact
of the incentive problems.
16Since  high  quality  borrowers  pay  higher  interest  than  they  would  under  perfect  information,
and  low  quality  borrowers  pay  Lower  interest  than  they  would  otherwise,  the  former  are  more  tikely
to  drop  out  of  the  market  as  the  riskless  rate  rises.  This  reduces  the  quality  mix,  making  the
lemons  problem  worse.  See  StigLitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  and  Mankiw  (1986).
17Bankruptcy  cost  could  also  make  the  supply  curve  bend  backwards,  since  the  probability  of
bankruptcy  is  increasing  in  the  loan  rate.  See  Williamson  (1987)  for  an  example.
tiA  fSrm's  0  ratio  equals  the  ratio  of  the  marginal  product  of  capital  to  the  replacement  cost.
Under  perfect  capital  markets,  firms  with  a values  exceeding  unity  should  always  be  investing.  The
relatfonship  breaks  down  with  imperfect  capital  markets,  however  (see,  e.g.,  Fazzari,  Hubbard  and
Peterson,  1988).17
The  relationship  between  Q values  and  exposure  to  credit  problems  is
consistent  with  the  evidence.19  Fazzari,  Hubbard  and  Peterson  (1988)  show
that,  on  average,  Q values  are  higher  for  U.S.  corporations  firms  that  are
likely  to  face  credit-constraints.  (See  also  Gilchrist  (1990).]  Cross-country
evidence  is  supportive  as  well.  Kong  (1991)  demonstrates  that  the  average  Q
values  for  Korean  corporations  are  considerably  above  the  norm  for  U.S.  firms,
and  cites  credit  market  problems  as  a  likely  explanation.
IIXb.  Financial  Structure
The  nature  of  the  financial  arrangement  --  the  payoff  structure,
covenants,  etc.,  --  affects  the  incentives  of  borrowers.  In  this  respect,
financial  structure  influences  real  decisions  when  either  limited  information
or  limited  enforcement  are  factors.  One  would  expect  that  individuals  design
financial  relationships  to  minimize  any  loss  in  the  value  of  the  investment
owing  to  potential  incentive  problems.  By  pursuing  this  logic,  we  are  able  to
pin  down  financial  structure.
The  exact  financial  structure  that  arises  of  course  depends  on  the
nature  of  the  informational  and  enforcement  problems.  No general  results  are
available.  In  many  cases,  particularly  ones  where  moral  hazard  is  a  problem,
standard  debt  emerges  as  the  optimal  contract.  Debt  mitigates  the  incentive
problem  by forcing  the  borrower  to  internalize  the  consequences  of  his
actions. 2 0 It  does  so  by  making  him  the  residual  claimant  for  his
investment.
Under  a  debt  contract  the  borrower  pays  a  fixed  obligation  contingent  on  not
defaulting,  and  gets  to  keep  the  remainder  of  his  net  earnings;  while  he  loses
everything  (including  possibly  his  job)  in  the  event  of  default.
190 coutd  also  be  above  unity  if  there  is  imperfect  competition.  It  could  also  be  temporarily
above unity  If  there  are  adjustment  costs.  Gilchrist  controls  for  these  factors  and  still  finds  an
Snportant  effect  of  credit  constraints.
20Recent approaches  to  motivating  debt  include  Lacker  (1990)  who emphasizes  the  inability  to
observe  borrower  cash  flows  (somewhat in  the  spirit  of  Townsend (1979),  though  with  an  emphasis  on
collateral  rather  than  costly  state  verification  to  resolve  the  incentive  problem.  Hart  and Moore
(1988)  emphasuze  the  control  right  that  debt  affords.18
This tesult is somewhat fragile though.  In general, it is desirable to
condition payoffs and covenants on all economically relevant variables that
are publicly observable (and  thus easily verified in court).  Optimal
contracts often look something like equity, or perhaps a combination of debt
and equity.  For example, if systemic risk --  i.e., business cycle risk --
affects the investment outcome, then the optimal arrangement is not likely to
be simple debt, but rather a mixture of debt and equity, where equity acts as
a kind of cushion against the business cycle:  Incentive considerations
dictate that the borrower should bear considerable portion of the
idiosyncratic risk, but that the outside lenders should absorb the lion's
share of the systemic risk.21 Intuitively, it is not optimal to punish the
borrower if his investment is performing poorly because the economy is in
recession, as this is clearly a circumstance beyond his control.  Equity
facilitates sharing aggregate risks, as dividends may be lowered in recessions
and raised in booms.
Other devices to address the informational and enforcement problems
include: evaluation and monitoring; credit ceilings; collateral or balance
sheet requirements; and restrictions on the use of inputs (to the extent input
use is observable).  Adjusting the maturity structure is also a possibility.
Lenders may exert greater control over borrowers by issuing short term debt,
which in effect forces borrowers to regularly account for their actions.  This
consideration is likely an important factor underlying the absence of markets
for long-term credit in many developing countries.
Relatedly, lengthening the horizon of the borrower/lender relationship
improves financial efficiency.  An on-going relationship increases the control
lenders have over borrowers.  Informational barriers lessen with time.  A
richer menu of incentive devices is available. 22 Lenders can restrict access
to future credit in the wake of a poor earnings performance,  for example.
Long-term borrower/lender relationships, facilitated by financial
2lSee  Gertler  and Hubbard  '1991)  for  a formalization  of this  point.
22See for  example,  Townsend  (1987),  Green  (1987),  Stiglitty  and  Weiss  (1983)  and  Gertler  (1990).19
intermediaries, are characteristic of credit markets throughout the world.
Indeed, only in a few-developed countries, such as the U.S., are "arms-length"
credit transactions popular.
The general framework here also allows us to think about financial
institutions.  Financial intermediaries play two interrelated roles in this
kind of environment: One is loan evaluation and monitoring.  The other is
liquidity provision.  These features are central in traditional stories about
intermediation.  What is new in the last decade is capturing these features
with endogenously-motivated intermediary structures.
Evaluation and monitoring of borrowers is the most direct way to
confront  incentive problems.  Scale economies explain why lenders delegate
the job to financial institutions.  In this way, intermediaries reduce the
premium on external finance.  A theory of intermediary financial structure
emerges once one recognizes the potential for conflict of interests between
the intermediary and its depositors.  In the process of evaluating and
monitoring, the intermediary obtains information about borrowers that is not
readily available to depositors.  For the same general reasons as any borrower
of funds, the intermediary may wish to exploit its informational advantage.
Further, just as the intermediary might find it impossible or at least very
costly to enforce certain kinds of agreements with borrowers, depositors may
similarly have difficulty enforcing certain kinds of agreements with the
intermediary.
Like any rational borrower, the intermediary picks a financial structure
which minimizes the premium it must pay for external funds (depositor and
short term wholesale funds in the case of an intermediary).  An additional
device available to the intermediary is diversification.  By diversifying its
portfolio, the intermediary is able to reduce the impact of idiosyncratic risk
and, in doing so, reduce the scope it has for cheating its depositors.23  In
the limiting case of perfect diversification the only risk to the banks
23This  is the "delegated  monitoring  theory  of financial  intermediation,  developed  in  Diamond
(1984)  and  Williamson  (1986).20
portfolio is systemic.  Systemic shocks, however, are typically beyond the
intermediaries ability to disguise or control.  Diversification accordingly
reduces the "incentive" premium required to attract deposits.
Wrapped in the same package, thus, is an explanation for several basic
features of intermediation: evaluation and monitoring, heavily diversified
portfolios, and asset transformation (liabilities safer than assets).  It is
possible to extend the basic story to capture additional characteristics.  For
example, one hypothesis for why the intermediaries issue demandable debt is
that the short maturity provides depositors a way to discipline the
intermediary, much the same way as shortening the maturity structure gives any
lender greater leverage over a borrower. 24
We can extend our thinking to interpret the role of intermediaries in
liquidity provision.Z5 Problems of limited information and enforcement
preclude most individuals and firms from using the securities market to
perfectly insure against sudden needs for funds.  Intermediaries offer
liquidity in two basic ways.  One is by issuing liabilities that are safe and
short term, possibly demandable.  The other is by entering arrangements to
provide loans on short term notice, either explicitly by offering a
line-of-credit or implicitly as the outcome of an on-going relationship with a
borrower.  By overcoming informational barriers that could slow the process
down, intermediaries are able to facilitate the delivery of loanable funds
required on short term notice.
Liquidity provision contributes to financial efficiency in two related
ways.  First, it reduces both the risk of saving and the risk of investing;
and therefore lowers the premium on external finance.  Second, it mitigates
the need for inefficient forms of self-insurance.  By diversifying independent
risks, intermediaries can minimize the quantity of safe assets needed to
provide liquidity insurance, and can therefore minimize the diversion of funds
24See  Catomirls  and Kahn  (forthcoming).
25See  also  Caprio and Honohan,  (1991).21
from productive investments.  This latter point really applies to the role of
intermediation in all forms of insurance.
Along with the benefits of having financial institutions provide
liquidity come potential costs.  The costs stem from the potential strain
placed on intermediary balance sheets.  The process of liquidity provision
(often) appears to involve supplying liquid liabilities in conjunction with
holding illiquid assets.  This is particularly true for commercial banking.
Asset illiquidity results from the information-intensive nature of most F  k
loans.  As we have suggested, a bank is likely to possess considerably g..  er
information about the quality of its loans (and so on) than substitute
lenders.  For "lemons" reasons, accordingly, liquid secondary markets for
commercial bank loans typically do not exist.  Even in the U.S., markets for
loan spies are in a relatively primitive form.  Those kinds of markets which
do succeed often involve assets with a recognizable collateral value, such as
houses or automobiles.  (Indeed, it is interesting to note that U.S. financial
markets could not support an active eecondary market for junk bonds.)
The particular combination of liquid deposits and illiquid loans makes
banks subject to the risk of depositor panics.  This basic feature of
commercial banking is the oft-cited as the reason for public intervention in
banking in most countries.  26 Interventions take the form of either explicit
deposit insurance, as in the U.S., or concentration of banking with implicit
government guarantees, as in Japan and most of Europe.
The issue of public intervention is subject to considerable debate,
however.  The cost of publicly safeguardii.g  financial institutions is reducing
the incentives of these institutions to safeguard themselves.  Undertaking
costly evaluation and monitoring of loans is less profitable, for example, if
an intermediary can always rely on readily available, publicly insured
deposits.  In addition, it may be directly profitable for institutions to take
advantage of the publicly provided insurance subsidy by investing in risky
projects, even  if they yield negative present value.  The institution profits
26Diaord  and  Dybvig  (1983)  present  a modeL aimed  at  this  Issue.22
if  its  loan  portfolio  pays  off,  while  the  taxpayers  pick  up  the  tab  in  the
opposite  case.  The  savings  and loan  scandal  attests  to  this  point.  So  do
aspects  of  the  liberalization  calamity  in  South  America,  as  we  discuss  later.
Key  to  the  debate  over  public  intervention  is  whether  intermediaries  can
design  private  financial  arrangements  to  insulate  themselves  from  distress. 2 7
One  device,  for  example,  is  suspension  of  convertibility.  Though,  as  many
have  argued,  this  mechanism  does  not  work  well  if  systemic  factors  are
responsible  for  depositor  outflows.  Other  possibilities  include  indexing
deposit  contracts  to  systemic  disturbances.  The  advantage  of  this  approach  is
thaL  it  forces  depositors  to  share  the  impact  of  systemic  shocks,  as opposed
to  having  the  payoff  depend  on  their  respective  places  in  line  at  the  bank. 28
It  is  this  latter  feature  of  bank  liabilities,  in  conjunction  with  illiquid
bank  assets,  that  makes  these  institutions  subject  to  depositor  panics.
On the  other  hand,  it  is  an  open  question  as  to  whether  in  fact  it  is
practical  for  depository  institutions  to  offer  suitably  indexed  deposits.
Even  if  it  is  difficult  to  pin  down  the  precise  theoretical  reasoning,
historical  experience  suggests  that  purely  private  attempts  to  insure  the
financial  system  do  not  work  well  in  the  presence  of  systemic  disturbances.
The  experience  of  the  Great  Depression  is  perhaps  the  best  example  of  this
point.
IIc.  Borrower  Met  Worth  and  Financial  Efficiency
The  predictions  about  real  activity  and  financial  structure  that  evolve
from  these  kinds  of  models  are  often  closely  tied  to  the  details  of  the
particular  environment,  including  the  exact  nature  of  the  incentive  problem.
Empirical  relevance,  however,  requires  general  predictions.  One  broad
implication  of  these  theories  is  that  the  premium  for  external  finance  --  and
27For some interesting  perspectives  on  this  issue,  see  Wallace  (1989) and  Chari  (1990).
2SDiamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  refer  to  this  feature  of  deposit  contracts  as  "the  sequential
service  constraint.11  The depositor  aiways  bears  the  risk  that,  if  he  is  not  early  enough  in  line,
he  can  lose  everything.  This  contrasts  with  equity,  for  example,  where  tosses  are  shared  equalLy
by cre4itors.23
hence the magnitude of the distortion of real activity --  depends inversely on
borrower net worth, broadly defined. 29 As we will argue, the behavior of
borrower net worth is at the core of the link between finance and aggregate
economic activity.  This includes being a factor that determines the extent of
intermediation.  Financial crises, further, can often be interpreted as
involving severe disruptions of borrower net worth.
We define a borrower's net worth as the sum of his net liquid assets and
the collateral value of his assets not in liquid form.  The latter consists of
not only tangible physical assets, but also of any prospective future earnings
that the borrower can credibly offer as collateral.  In the example of the
farmer, borrower net worth includes his net financial assets and the
unencumbered value of his capital equipment (e.g., tractors) and land.
Suppose further that the farmer is especially talented at managing his
particular plot of land.  Then any expected future rents earned from this
skill that he can credibly post as collateral for a current loan also enter
the measure of his relevant net worth. 30
Simply put, greater net worth implies either additional funds available
for internal finance or additional collateral available to back external
finance.  More precisely, greater net worth increase a borrower's potential
stake in his investment.  This serves to aligi.  his incentives more closely
with outside lenders', and thus lower the required premium on external funds.
In the limiting case where his net worth is sufficient to effectively permit
him a one hundred percent stake in his investment, the borrower completely
internalizes all the consequences of his actions.31 The premium for external
29sernwne  and  Gertler  (1989.  1990)  and  Calomiris  and  Hubbard  (1990)  emphasize  this  mechanism.
See  Hubbard  and  Kashyap  (1992)  for  direct  evidence.  GreenwaLd  and  Stiglitz  (1986)  offer  a  related
story,  which  centers  on  equity  rationing.
30Note  that  the  ex  post  return  on  assets  serving  as  collateral  need  not  be  certain;  the  value
of  the  collateral  will  simply  incorporate  the  effect  of  the  uncertainty.  What  is  important,  however,
is  that  the  borrower-in  this  case  the  farmer-is  unable  to  secretly  manipulate  the  ex  post  return.
311f the  borrower  is  risk-neutral,  it  Is  always  optimal  for  him  to  invest  as  much  of  his  wealth
as  possible  in  his  own  project,  up  to  the  point  where  the  premium  for  externaL  finance  is  driven  to
toro.  If  he is  risk  averse,  a tradeoff  emerges  between  the  need  to  reduce  the  premiun  for  external
finance and the need to  diversify.  Incentive  considerations  dictate  that,  in  general,  the  borrower
Is  loss than fully  insured.  The  text  elaborates  on  this  point.24
finance disappears.  Conversely, if his net worth is sufficiently low --
negative net worth is a possibility, if past debts are high --  the required
premium may be prohibitive.  Lenders may refuse to supply funds despite the
fact the investment may have a positive present value in setting of perfect
markets.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of a shift in borrower net worth on
investment.  An increase in net worth raises the threshold value of investment
above which suppliers of external finance impose a premium.  The supply curve
shifts rightwards as a consequence.  The demand curve may also shift
rightward, partly because greater net worth might permit the borrower to
obtain more insvrance, and partly because his willingness to bear risk may
rise (if his relative risk aversion is declining in wealth).  The combined
effect of the shifts in the supply and demand curves is to lower the premium
attached to  external finance at each level of investment.  The equilibrium
level of investment rises accordingly.
It is important to emphasize the simultaneous nature of the interaction
between financial and real factors.  A kind of financial propagation mechanism
emerges.  The borrower's accumulated net worth depends both on his past
earnings and on his anticipated future prospects.  2  Thus, previous economic
shocks persist into the future by affecting the current premium for external
finance.  A streak of good harvests, for example, allows the farmer to build
up his stock of financial aseets, and consequantly improve the terms under
which he receives new lcans.  Conversely, beliefs about future economic
fundamentals feed into the present, also by influencing the premium for
external finance.  News that corn prices are likely to be low for the next
five years reduces the value of the farmer's land.  Expected future
qausi-rents owing to his particular farming talent decline as well.  The
combined effect of this pessimism about the future on his net worth raises the
premium he must pay to borrow funds for the current planting season.
32Gertter  (1990)  formalizes  how  beliefs  about  future  economic  conditions  inpacts  on  borrower  net
worth,  in  a setting  with  multi-period  financiaL  arrangements.25
Overall,  financial  factors  magnify  swings  in  economic  activity. This
kind  of prediction  is  true  both  at the  cyclical  and secular  frequencies,
implying  that  the analysis  is  relevant  to growth  as well  as business
fluctuations.33
The simple  framework  also  provides  some insight  into  how a collapse  in
borrower  net  worth  could  generate  a financial  crisis. There  are  several  ways
this  might  come  about. One is a revaluation  of unindexed  debt  due  to a large
unanticipated  shift  in  the  price  level  or the  exchange  rate.  A classic
example  of the former  is  the sharp  deflation  of the  Depression  which,  over  a
four  year  period,  raised  the  real  value  of outstanding  debts  nearly  thirty
percent.34  As we will discuss  latter,  sharp  rises  in exchange  rates  in  the
1980s  similarly  raised  the real  value  of foreign  debts  owed  by borrowers  in
Latin  American  countries. 35 Another  pos.ibili  y is a sharp  fall in  the  value
of collateral  owing  to events  in the  real  economy. The  decline  in  real  estate
prices  in  the  U.S. is a  good example,  as is  the decline  in  export  prices  for
Latin  American  countries. The  sharp  rise  in  world  interest  rates  in  the late
seventies  and  early  eighties  had  a qualitatively  similar  impact  on discounted
values  of collateral  assets. Finally,  policy  changes  that have  redistributive
effects,  such  as structural  adjustment  programs,  are  capable  also  produce  the
kind  of sharp  owing  in  borrower  net  worth  that  could  lead  to a financial
crisis  (see  Caprio,  1991).
In  each of these  cases,  the  sudden  large  drop  in borrower  net  worth
yanks  both  the supply  and  demand  curves  for  funds  inward^  sharply  contracting
investment. Indeed,  if  the  borrower's  net  worth  becomes  sufficiently
negative,  investment  is  no longer  feasible. In  this case,  the  supply  curve
moves  leftward  to the  point  where  it is no longer  intersects  the  demand  curve
at a positive  value  of investment  (or,  where  it  bends  backward  before  it
reaches  a  positive  investment  level.) Figure  4 illustrates  an "investment
33For  an apptication  of this  kind  of mechanism  to  growth,  see  Banerjee  and Newman  (1991).
34Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989)  provide  a formal-though  styLized-anaLysis  of  a debt  deflation.
35See  Froot  and  Stein  (forthcoming)  for  an  example  of  how  exchange  rate  reva(uations  may induce
wealth  redistributions  that  have  real  affects.  The  example  they  pursue  is  foreign  direct  investment.26
collapse", owing to insufficient borrower net worth.
Net worth is also a relevant consideration for the efficiency and extent
of financial intermediation. 36 By building up its capital base, an
intermediary is able to reduce the premium it must pay for depositor funds,
just as any borrower with greater net worth is able to reduce the premium
required for external finance.  A fluid system of financial intermediation is
therefore more likely with a weLl capitalized group of financial institutions.
It also follows that a sharp decline in intermediary net worth is a potential
source of disruption.  As with individual borrowers, possible causes are
sudden declines in the collateral value of assets or in expected future
profits.  A sharp rise in interest rates for example could reduce the value of
an intermediary's long-term assets.  It could also lower expected future
profits by reducing both the quantity and quality of the intermediary's
potential loan customers.
hIId.  Summary implications  for finance and growth
Our analysis suggests a symbiotic relation between finance end growth.
Development of the real sector tends to reduce the premium attached to
external finance, which in turn serves to stimulate further development.
Several broad empirical regularities are associated with this process:
evolution from self-finance to external finance; development of
intermediation, ane subsequent development of markets for direct credit;
increased access to world capital marksts; and, finally, narrowing of the
spread between loan and deposit rates, along with a rise in the riskless rate.
Underlying the general process are several interrelated factors.
First, as economies develop, the average net worth of its borrowers
improves. An analogy may be drawr with the experience of a firm over its
life-cycle.  When the firm starts up it has low net worth for two basic
reasons: it has limited financial resources and collaterizeable assets; and it
36See  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1987)  for  a  formalization  of  this  point.27
has an unsure horizon.  The cost of external finance is high, accordingly.
The firm thus relies heavily on internal funds to finance investments.  Over
time it accumulates both financial and physical assets.  Also, by establishing
a track record and gaining experience, it possibly raises the market's
assessment of its survival probability.  The resulting rise in net worth makes
obtaining external finance feasible.  The likely first candidate is bank
credit, since net worth is probably still insufficient to eliminate gains from
evaluation and monitoring.  As the firm grows further and establishes a more
certain horizon, it may eventually reach the point where net worth is
sufficient to obtain direct credit.  Indeed, one may think of a developed
country relative to a developing one as having the cross-section of its
borrowers consist of a greater fraction with characteristics resembling firms
in the mature phase of its life-cycle, as opposed to the early phase.
External effects are likely to be important as well.  If increasing
returns are important, the evolution of net worth is likely to depend on the
development of the aggregate economy, as well as on individual factors.  That
is, there are likely to be external effects on expected profitability, and
therefore external effects on borrower net worth.
In this regard, our story is quite compatible with recent growth theory
(e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1986).  This literature appeals to spillover
effects on productivity stemming from increasing returns to explain why
persistent growth rates between developed and less developed countries are
possible --  i.e., why diminishing returns doesn't take over --  and relatedly
why development traps are possible.  To the extent the external effects impact
on borrower net worth, financial factors --  via the effect on the premium
attached to external finance --  amplify the impact of increasing returns on
growth.  Relatedly, they tighten the potential development trap.  Net worth is
likely to be lower than would be otherwise for borrowers in a country that is
not exploiting increasing returns - e.g., due to low human capital
development.  Consequently the typical premium on external finance is higher,
which in  turn inhibits investment further, making it even more difficult to
exploit the increasing returns (via  human capital accumulation, etc.)  Thus,28
financial considerations would seem to exaggerate the dispersion in output
growth rates owing to increasing returns.  Along with this prediction comes a
theory of relative capital market development as well.
There is another respect in which increasing returns may be a factor in
financial development.  As the pool of quality borrowers increases, the
potential for a thick secondary market for the securities of these borrowers
rises.  The stock market in the U.S., for example, would not be active if
there were only a few suppliers of equity.  The fact that there are many
potential suppliers contributes to increasing the liquidity of the market.
The presence of the liquid market in turn lowers the cost of the issuing
equity.  The experience of the U.S. junk bond market is informative here.  The
costs of issuing junk fell when it was perceived that a liquid market was
possible.  When the secondary market fell apart (in the wake of increasing
defaults on these bonds), the coet of issuing junk rose precipitously.
Another important factor involves the evolution of the auditing and
enforcement technologies that occurs as economies develop.  To the extent
there are increasing returns in developing legal systems, we would expect the
ability to enforce contractual relationships to rise as economies develop.
Development and adoption of monitoring and evaluation technologies should
contribute to reduce the p.  amium on external finance.
Growth also stimulates the development of financial intermediation,
which in turn feeds back into growth.37 Intermediaries of course benefit
frow improvements in monitoring and enforcement technologies.  Competition
ensures that these benefits are passed on to savers and investors.
Improvements in the overall quality of borrowers increases the base of
potential loan customers, and accordingly facilitating the development of
intermediation, especially to the extent increasing returns is important to
the development of financial institutions.  Also, fixed costs in developirn an
effective regulatory system suggests that richer countries may have an
advantage in mitigating the bad incentive effects associated with providing a
37see  Greenwood and  Jovanovic  (1990)  who emphasize  the  inportance  of  fixed  costs.29
public safety net for the financial system.
Finally, the reduction in the premium for external finance that
accompanies the development of intermediatic  (and the growth of borrower inet
worth) manifests itself in a reduced spread between the loan and deposit
rate.38 Further, the increased liquidity provision connected with an
enhanced intermediary sector reduces the need for self-insurance.  This tends
to lower the value placed on riskleas securities.  The riskless rate rises for
this reason, and also because the decline in the premiunm  for external finance
pushes up the competitive equilibrium return on saving.
In sum, a natural product of improved development of the real sector is
a more efficient financial sector, and vice-versa.  The reduction in the
premium for external funds increases investment and improves the allocation of
existing investment funds.  For an open economy, the improved efficiency of
the domestic financial system enables more funds to flow in from abroad
relative to the existing benchmark.
IV.  Problems of Developing Countries
We now turn our attention to two closely related issues are particularly
relevant to the experiences of developing countries.  The first involves the
consequences of financial repression and the second, the consequences of
financial liberalization.  Ment4oned along in this discussion are the
consequences of the debt crisis.
IVa.  Financial Repression
As we have been emphasizing, a well functioning financial system
features private contracts and private institutions designed to minimize the
problems of limited information and enforcement.  The most direct way the
3Unfortunately,  it  Is  tough  to  get  good  measures  of  the  spread  between  Loan  and  deposits  rates
for  many  LDCs. See  Hanson  and  Rocha  (1985)  for  a discussion.  In  principLe,  checking  whether
loan/deposit  spreads  are  higher  and  riskiess  rates  are  lower  in  poorer  countries  would  seem  to  be
a  good  way  to  test  some  of  our  theory.  One  major  difficulty,  however,  is  that  factors  such  as
reserve  requirements  and  other  legal  restrictions  wiLl  influence  the  spread.4
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government can contribute to this process is by offering an efficient
judicial/regulatory  system, one which facilitates the enforcement of private
contracts and punishes fraud effectively.  There is as well a role for some
kind of public safety net to guard against a disruptive liquidity crisis, as
we have discussed.  But this objective must be balanced against the efficiency
costs of providing public insurance.
Historically, public intervention in credit markets in developing
countries seems to go well beyond the "minimalist" approach just described,
despite virtually unanimous agreement that these interventions have been
largely detrimental.  As we see it, the traditional approaches fail by not
attacking the basic sources of frictions in credit markets: the incentive
problems owing to limited information and limited enforcement.  Instead,
governments have tried to directly manage credit flows through systems of
subsidies, interest rate ceilings, and direct government intermediation.  Not
only do these policies inhibit the functioning of the price system; if
anything, by inhibiting the formation of disciplining mechanisms in the
private market, they tend to magnify the adverse consequences of the
information and enforcement problems.
Conventional discussions of financial repression focus on the allocative
consequences of interest rate ceilings, targeted credit programs, and
regulatory costs imposed on intermediation such as reserve requirements.  The
analysis usually proceeds by taking a market that would otherwise function
perfectly well, and then exploring the consequences of a government induced
distortion such as a loan or deposit rate ceiling.  In our view, the relevant
laissez-faire benchmark should allow for distortions in financial markets
prior to government intervention, owing to the kinds of incentive problems we
have been discussing.  An additional consideration then, is how the government
policies affects the incentives of borrowers (including  financial
intermediaries) to exploit the environment of limited information and limited
enforcement.
Government managed and controlled intermediaries are likely  less31
efficient at confronting incentive problems.  One example of this is a lax
approach to collecting delinquent debts, cited by Venereso as pervasive in
many developing countries.  Because the intermediaries in these countries are
heavily subsidized (either  explicitly or implicitly), they lack the internal
incentives required to ensure that they properly screen and monitor loans.
This allows the potential for abuse by borrowers, resulting in a poor overall
performance of the loan portfolio.  The reduced return on assets lowers the
feasible rate that can be paid to depositors.  In turn, the quantity of
private funds the intermediary may attract falls.
The experience of many LDCs with state development banks is highly
relevant to this discussion.  These institutions were introduced to provide a
conduit for long-term finance as an initial step toward developing private
markets for equity and long-term debt.  As we have argued, however, there is a
"chicken-and-egg" aspect to this problem.  To thrive, private markets for
long-term capital require large numbers of quality borrowers - i.e., high net
worth borrowers.  Unfortunately, because of  the incentive problems inherent in
the process, a system of publicly managed and subsidized funds is unlikely to
create a core of borrowers core of borrowers who would be creditworthy in the
absence of  government help.  Not surprisingly, state development banks have
generally failed to produce well-functioning private markets for long-term
finance.
A better approach to developing a thriving capital market, in our view,
is to concentrate directly on promoting a viable borrowing class.  We would
recommend direct investment tax credits for borrowers, with borrowers then
competing for private funds, as a superior alternative to publicly managed and
subsidized credit.  Tax credits not only increase the incentive to invest,
they also reduce the premium for external finance by raising borrowers' net
worth.  The overall increase in borrower creditworthiness raises the
likelihood of well-functioning private capital market.  We of course do not
mean to suggest that tax credits alone would suffice.  A strong system of
contract enforcement and a stable policy environment are also crucial.32
Ivb. Financial Liberalization
In  the  1970s  and  80s,  a  number  of  developing  countries  liberalized  their
financial  markets.  In  a  number  of  Latin  American  countries  the  reforms
initially  produced  chaos.39  The  much  desired  efficiency  gains  did  not  seem
to  materialize.  The  Aslaz.  countries  that  liberalized  fared  somewhat  better.
In  a  few  countries,  such  as  Korea  and  Malaysia,  the  experiment  appears  to  have
worked.
In  our  view,  the  liberalizations  failed  to  meet  expectations  for  three
main  reasons.  First,  accompanying  the  rise  in  loan  rates  --  as  an  unfortunate
side  effect  --  was a  rise  in  the  required  external  finance  premium  for  a
substantial  class  borrowers.  If  markets  operate  perfectly  under
laissez-faire,  then  the  increase  in  loan  rates  resulting  from  deregulation  is
uniformly  desirable.  True,  some  borrowers  are  chased  out  of  the  market.
However,  these  borrowers  are  inefficient;  they  cannot  function  profitably  when
the price  of  investment  funds  reflects  their  true  opportunity  cost.
Matters  change,  however,  if  the  true  laissez-faire  benchmark  involves
the  kind  of  frictions  in  the  financial  process  that  we  have  been  describing.
The  rise  in  interest  rates  produces  a  drop  in  borrower  net  worth.  The  market
value  of  collaterizeabie  assets  falls.  So  does  the  discounted  future  stream
of profits.  The  drop  in  net  worth  forces  up  the  premium  for  external  finance,
even  for  borrowers  who  could  operate  proiitably  if  markets  were  perfect.  At
least  in  short  run,  therefore,  deregulation  can  push  investment  further  below
the  optimum.  We  don't  mean  to  suggest  that  the  status  quo  of  financial
repression  was  preferable;  rather,  only  that  one  must  be  wary  of  certain
pitfalls  when  incentive  problems  hinder  the  operation  of  private  financial
markets.
A  second  factor  involves  timing.  Typically,  it  was  bad.  Many  of  the
39There  are  numerous  papers  which  provide  exceltent  descriptions  of  the  financial  crisis
associated  with  the  liberalizations.  Diaz-Alejandro  (1983)  is  a  classic  reference.  See  also,  for
example:  Atiyas  (1990),  Hinds  (1988),  Tybout  (1986),  and  Venereso  (1986). On the  other  hand,  there
is  also  some  evidence  of  positive  effects  of  liberalizations.  See  de  La  Cuadra  and  Valdes  Prieto
(1990),  who discuss  the  case  of  Chile.33
liberalizations coincided with aggregate economic downturns.  The economic
slowdown and high interest rates that plagued industrialized countries in the
late 70s and early 80s spilled over to developing countries.  The combination
of rising interest rates and falling export prices produced a precipitous
decline in borrower net worth, forcing up the premium for external finance.
The absence of substantial equity markets made borrowers in these developing
countries particularly vulnerable.  As we mentioned earlier, equity markets
help cushion borrowers against adverse economic shocks by forcing creditors to
share the risk of the downturn.  The buildup of foreign debts during the 1970s
also increased vulnerability.  The poor macroeconomic climate forced many
countries to devalue their currencies.  Because many loans were denominated in
units of foreign currency, the devaluations redistributed wealth from domestic
borrowers to foreign creditors, further reducing domestic borrower net worth.
Overall, macroeconomic conditions were independently pressing up the
premium for external finance.  The liberalizations, thus, were the second part
of a "double whammy" on domestic borrowers.  As mentioned, one notable
exception was Korea.  The Korean liberalization, interestingly enough,
happened in good economic times, during an export boom.  The lesson seems to
be that, because of the importance of borrower net worth to the sound
functioning of financial markets, financial policy cannot be conducted
independently of macroeconomic considerations.  Our message is not that
liberalizations should be delayed indefinitely until macroeconomic conditions
are perfect, but rather that they should not be pursued independently of
policies designed to directly promote growth and stability of the real sector.
Liberalizations alone are unlikely to turn an economy around stagnation; and,
for the reasons we have discussed, can exacerbate the situation when pursued
unilaterally in an environment of economic stagnation.
The third consideration involves the failure in most cases to adequately
coordinate liberalization aith the design of the financial safety net.  In
many cases, the government maintained either an explicit or implicit
commitment to prevent intermediaries from failing, while at the same time
greatly loosening the rein on the kind of investments they could pursue. This34
kind of  policy only served to increase the inceitives of financial
institutions to abuse publicly-provided insurance.  For this reason, required
along with deregulation was increased supervision and monitoring of banks.
But as Diaz-Alejandro (1985)  noted, the Latin American countries largely
failed to anticipate this need.  Lax government monitoring permitted an
environment of lax lending policies.  What emerged was a vicious cycle of
government bailouts and inefficient intermediation.  In this regard, there is
a strong parallel with the savings and loan crisis in the U.S.
V.  Evidence
We have argued that an important aspect of growth is a decline in the
premium for external finance.  As economies develop, therefore, one should
expect an evolution from self-finance to formal credit relationships.  Indeed,
at least since Gurley and Shah-  (1956) and Goldsmith (1968), development
economists, have believed that financial deepening was an important aspect of
growth.  Much of recent growth theory, however, has ignored financial
considerations.  In this section, we update the evidence on financial
deepening.  The general motive is to confirm the potential relevance of the
kind theories we have been describing.  One way our analysis differs from much
of the previous work is that we make explicit use of panel data techniques:
that is, we exploit information from both the time series and the
cross-section.
Our work is non-structural in the sense that we do not estimate a formal
statistical model.  Further, we do not deal with the all- important question
of causality, so that the linkages between the financial system and the real
economy are not explicitly identified.  Rather, we seek, at least initially,
to develop robust generalizations at the level of descriptive statistics.  As
is true of much non-structural econometric work, our results cannot verify
hypotheses, but they are capable of refuting theories.  The spirit of our
empirical work is to present facts which constitute a benchmark to
discriminate between viable and implausible theories.35
We take as measures of financial deepening the ratios of various
monetary and credit aggregates to income.  Our main result --  which confirms
the thinking of many development economists and which is compatible with the
simple theory we outlined --  is that financial deepening is an important
characteristics of the growth process.  A one percent increase in real per
capita income is typically associated with approximately a 1.5% increase in
the various "financial deepening" measures.  Further, this result is  robust to
a wide variety of perturbations.  We also find a positive connection between
private external borrowing at per capita GNP within the set of developing
countries, as our theory predicts.
Va.  Data
Most of our data is taken from the IMF's International Financial
Statistics (the data has been checked fc-~  errors and is available upon
request).  The data is annual, usually spanning 1950 through 1988.  We usually
focus on a set of 69 developing countries.  These countries satisfy the
criteria established by Gertler and Rogoff (1990);  they are rnon-communist  and
have populations over a million. 40 For purposes of comparison, we have also
collected data for 21 developed countries.  A virtue of restricting attention
mainly to LDCs is that the financial data in the IFS statistics summarizes
virtually all of the formal credit flows in these countries.  Missing are data
on stock and bond markets, which are important conduits of credit in many
industrialized countries. 41
Since we are not testing a specific structural model, but rather
gathering stylized facts, we take a somewhat eclectic view about our measures
4 0The  countries  are (listed  in alphabetical  order):  Algeria;  Argentina;  Bangladesh;  Benin;
Bolivia;  Botswana; Brazil;  Burkina  Faso;  Burundi;  Cameroon; Central  African  Republic;  Chad; Colombia;
Congo; Costa  Rica;  Cote d'lvoire;  Dominican  Republic;  Ecuador;  Egypt;  EL Salvador;  Ethiopia;  Gabon;
Ghana;  Guatemala;  Haiti;  Honduras;  India;  Indonesia;  Jamaica;  Jordan;  Kenya;  Korea;  Lesotho;  Liberia;
Madagascar;  Malawi;  Hali;  Mauritania;  Mexico;  Morocco;  Myarnar;  Nepal;  Niger;  Nigeria;  Pakistan;
Panama; Papua;  New Guinea;  Piraguay;  Peru;  Philippines;  Portugal;  Rwanda; Senegal;  Sierra  Leone;
Somalia;  Sri  Lanka;  Sudan;  S;yria;  Tanzania;  Thailand;  Togo;  Tunisia;  Turkey;  Uganda;  Uruguay;
Venezuela;  Yemen  Arab  Republic:  Zaire;  and Zambia.
41Listed  in  alphabetical  order,  the  developed  countries  are  as  follows:  Australia;  Austria;
Belgium; Canada;  Denmiark;  Finland;  France;  Germany;  Greece; Iceland; Ireland;  Italy; Japan;
Luxembourg;  Netherlands;  New Zealand;  Norway;  Spain;  Sweden;  Switzerland;  UK; and USA.36
of financial depth.  We focus on two measures of credit, but also use a
variety of  other measures to ensure that our statistical generalizations are
robust.  Given that our theoretical analysis applies to private credit flows
(and that publicly provided credit contains a strong subsidy element) the
measure of greatest interest is private domestic credit.  Combining the claims
on the private sector by the monetary authorities and the deposit money banks
(IFS line 32d); we usually refer to this variable as "credit".  We also
concentrate on "quasi-money" (IFS line 35), the difference between M2 and Mi.
This variable may be viewed as an indicator of the depth of financial
intermediation, since it reflects the component of intermediation that is more
likely to be driven by lending and borrowing and borrowing considerations,
than by the demand for a transactions medium.  To  check our concXusions, we
often use variables such as total domestic credit (including claims on central
and local governments as well as other banking institutions, IFS line 32) and
142  (the sum of IFS lines 34 and 35) for credit and quasi-money respectively.
We also experiment with broader measures of money and credit, but do not
report them here since the results are largely unchanged.  Finally, we
obtained measures of external borrowing from the world debt tables.
We usually convert our variables to real per capita data measured in
American dollars.  To do this, we use the country-specific period average
(nominal  bilateral) market exchange rate (IFS series "rf") to convert data
into dollars, and subsequently divide the data by the product of the domestic
population and the American GNP price deflator.  We usually transform all
variables by taking natural logarithms.
Vb.  Results
We attempt to establish a broad empirical characterization of
relationship between financial depth and real per capita income.  To do so we
examine correlations between the (log  of the) level of (real per capita dollar
income), and the (log  of the) ratio of credit to GDP.  We find strong evidence
of a positive correlation: countries with higher income have deeper financial
systems.  Again, we stress that our work is descriptive, so that the causal37
interpretation of this finding is unclear; in future work we hope to clarify
the interpretation of this finding further.
Our empirical results are presented in Table I.  As is true of most of
our empirical work, the coefficients are estimated in a simple regression of
the log of the ratio of credit (or quasi-money) on a constant and the log of
real per capita income measured in American dollars.  Throughout, our focus is
on the slope coefficient.  The actual data is displayed in scatterplots of the
log of the credit/income ratio against the log of real income per capita (with
bordering univariate distributions and box-and-whiskers plots) in the
accompanying figui:e. The data is displayed in three ways: 1) pooled across
all years and developing countries; 2) pooled only across regions; and 3)
pooled only across specific years.  Pooled data for the ratio of quasi-money
to income is also displayed in the figure.
The first six rows of Table I describe our benchmark results.  The
slopes are positive and significantly so, in both economic and statistical
terms.  We estimate that a one percent increase in real per capita income is
aesociated with an increase in the ratio of private credit to GDP of 0.42%;
the comparable increase in the ratio of quasi-money to GDP is similar,
0.56%.  42 The intercepts of both equations are significantly negative at
conventional significance levels (this is also true in virtually all
perturbations of the basic equations).
These results are quite robust to a variety of perturbations of the
basic framework; some of the sensitivity analysis is explicitly tabulated in
Table I.  For instance, the finding of a positive and significant slope is
robust to: the exact measure of credit used; sub-sampling by region or year;
accounting for country-specific "fixed effect" means; and inclusion of year-
specific time dummies, a linear trend, or inflation.  We have also taken
non-overlapping five year averages of our data to smooth out business cycle
42The  results  here  are consistent  with  Hanson  and NeaL  (1986),  who found  in a cross-section
study  of  36  LDCB  that  the  quantity  of Liquid  assets  relative  to  GDP  varied  positively  with  GDP. Our
interpretation  of this  relationship  --  which  emphasizes  the development  of intermediation  -- is
somewhat  different  though. For  this  reason,  we restricted  attention  to  the  non-Mi  component  of  M2.38
fluctuations and focus on longer-term secular trends, without altering our
basic results.  In a related check, our results are alsou  insensitive to
dividing the sample into high-growth and no-growth observations  (a country is
said to have experienced high growth if its real per capita dollar income rose
by over 3%).
We have also searched extensively for non-linearities in the
relationship between credit and income, using three different types of
techniques.  First, we tested for threshold effects by allowing the slopes of
the relationship between the (log  of the) credit/income ratio and (the log of
)  real per capita GNP to vary at discretely at intervals corresponding to
$1000 increments in real income.  Second, we incorpor-ited  higher polynomials
terms in our regressions.  Finally, we used more general non-parametric
techniques to allow for non-linearities of a very arbitrary nature.  However,
while we found results of mixed statistical significance (which seems hardly
surprising given the nature of the sample size), we almost never found
economically significant or interesting evidence of non-linearities.  That is,
a linear relationship between the (logs  of the) credit/income ratio and real
income appears to be quite consistent with the data.  The reason for this is
clear from the accompanying scatterplot graph, which portrays the data along
with fits from a simple linear regression and a non-parametric data smoother
(which can accommodate arbitrarily threshold effects and the like.)  The two
fitted lines are quite close and never differ by as much as a single standard
error in the span of the data.
Our finding of a positive relationship between real income and the
credit/income ratio is robust with one exception.  When we take first-
differences of the data, we find a strong negative relationship between the
variables of interest.  First differencing  emphasizes short-run variation in
the data and may be inappropriate in our case, since the theory we offer is
about the low frequency relationship between credit and output.  That is, our
story has little to say about the sign of the high frequency sign of
credit/output correlation (e.g., borrowing might rise to smooth out the impact
of a temporary downturn.)  Simply put, since level variables are likely to be39
better proxies for the true underlying low frequency variables than are first
differences, we view the "level" regressione as the appropriate representation
of the data.
With the short sample size (spanning a maximum of thirty-nine years) it
is perhaps unsurprising that one cannot reject the hypotheses that typically
the variables are individually integrated but not jointly co-integrated, at
conventional significance levels (the test statintics are computed on a
country by country basis; the signs of the co- integrating slope coefficients
linking the levels of income and the credit/income ratio are positive in
two-thirds of the cases).  Nevertheless, there are no indications of a
positive relationship between the growth rate of the credit/income ratio and
real income, even if the co-integrating residual is included in a regression
of the first-difference of the log of the credit/income ratio on the
first-difference of real income.  The slope coefficient is significantly
negative, indicating that growth in income is correlated with a decline in the
growth rate of the credit/income ratio; the co-integrating residual typically
has a positive coefficient (consistent  with a negative steady state
relationship between the credit/income ratio and real income).  We believe
that there are two lessons to be learned from chis.  First, using excessively
high-frequency data is potentially misleading, especially in the presence of
developing country data which may be measured with error.  Second, there may
be significant mean-reversion in the relationship between credit and income,
so that growing countries experience growth in the credit/income ratio at a
declining rate.  Both interpretations are corroborated by the fact that there
is typically no economically or statistically significant relationship between
the growth rates of income and credit/inoome ratios for developed countries.
In the future, we plan to explore our hypotheses further with non-linear
methods. In the meantime, we view this finding ae consistent with our
essential result of a strong positive relationship between income and
financial depth.
Finally, we examined the relation between (the log of) the ratio of
private external debt to GDP --  call this ratio "external debt" --  and per40
capita GDP.  We found that over the entire sample, each percentage point
increase in per capita GDP was associated with a .12  percentage increase in
"external debt".  The cross-sectional evidence suggested that the relation was
strongest in the 1970e and weakest in the late 1980e (i.e., the coefficient on
per capita GNP was .36 in a cross-sectional regression in 1970 and .15 in
1988).  These results reflect the fact tnat debt overhang became a problem in
the 1980s; everything else equal, a rise in net foreign indebtedness reduces
domestic borrower net worth, thus placing downward pressure on investment and
GDP (see  Gertler and Rogoff 1990).
VI.  Concluding Remarks
We have sketched a general framework intended to be useful for thinking
about the process of financial reform.  Many economists have stressed how
problems of asymmetric information and contract enforcement impede the
functioning of financial markets in developing countries.  our goal here was
to flesh out the broad empirical implications of these theories, so as to
enhance their relevance to policy.  We demonstrated now these theories may be
organized around the simple idea that informational and enforcement frictions
introduce a premium in the cost of external funds.  Factors such as the
financial health of borrowers, the efficiency of financial intermediation and
the ease of enforcing private financial contracts govern the size of this
premium.  How financial factors contribute to development may be understood
along these lines.  One may think also about finencial structure: ideally,
financial contracts and institutions ought to be designed to minimize this
premium.
What are the practical implications for policy-makers?  As usual, the
answers are easiest for the long term.  A largely decentralized capital market
is optimal.  While incentive problems may inhibit the functioning of financial
markets, the most direct way for the government mitigate them is to provide an
efficient system of contract enforcement.  As we have argued, because of
incentive problems inherent in non-market credit allocation, publicly managing
credit flows is only likely to further reduce the efficiency of investment.41
To the extent certain sectors merit public assistance, tax credits or
subsidies in conjunction with private allocation of credit is preferable to
directly regulating credit flows.  Other than acting as a lender-of-last
resort in times of a widespread financial crisis, the government should
ideally refrain from active involvement in the credit business.
The transition to the long-term?  Our approach suggests that
liberalization alone is not a panacea.  Financial and real development are a
4oint product.  While liberalization can ultimately enhance growth, a
successful liberalization in turn requires a viable borrowing class, i.e., a
sufficiently large cohort of borrowers for whom the premium for external
finance is not prohibitive.  That is, a thriving private capital market
depends niot  only a prudent regulatory regime, but also on having a thick core
of creditworthy borrowers.  In this regard, Leal sector policies - macro,
public finance, and trade policies - which directly stimulate growth and
stability should be pursued in concert with financial reform.42
Table  1
(standard  errors  in parentheses)
Private  Credit  Quasi-Money
Benchmark  Caset
Slope  .42  .56
(.02)  (.03)
Intercept  -4.68  -6.57
(.11)  (.18)
N  2050  2028
e  .686  1.087
Robustness  Checks  on Slopes:




Africa  .42  .47
(.03)  (.05)
Latin  America  .51  .55
(.04)  (.06)
Asia  .72  .63
(.06)  (.08)
Developed  Countries  .29  .31
(.03)  (.04)
With  Time  Dummies  .42  .52
(.02)  (.02)
With  Linear  Trend  .41  .63
(.02)  (.01)
5 year  Averages  .40  .57
(.04)  (.06)
1950  (N=15)  .33  .12
(.19)  (.24)
1960  .55  .78
(.15)  (.21)
1970  .45  .75
(.09)  (.15)
1980  .29  .29
(.09)  (.11)
1988  .54  .36
(.11)  (.12)
Growth  >  3%  .41  .63
(.03)  (.04)
Growth  c  0  .44  .52
(.03)  (.04'
Without  Country  Means  .35  .87
(.03)  (.05)
With  Inflation  .40  .54
(.02)  (.03)43
First  Difference  Slope  -. 17  -. 09
(in  ECH)  (.03)  (.04)44
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